De Beers is one of the longest lived international cartels in history. But have recent events threatened the diamond pricing structure so carefully developed over the past 100 years? In this paper, we use time series econometric techniques to evaluate the cartel's response to Russian cheating in the 1990s. We find that, despite massive Russian leaks, the cartel held to its long-term supply management policy of using its inventory to control the flow of rough diamonds into downstream markets. Although the cartel was able to survive the cheating, it remains unclear whether De Beers will continue to rely on its traditional strategy.
Introduction
Cartel theory suggests that serious punishment in the fonn of price competition is the predicted response to cheating by a cartel member, but recent work on cartel operations suggests that some cartels might use a richer set of more measured responses to support their arrangements. Levenstein (1997) and Genesove and Mullin (2001) describe cartels that used limited retaliation, as well as communication, to maintain collusion. However, even these cartels reacted to massive public cheating with the retaliatory response predicted by traditional theory.
The record of the diamond cartel, headed by De Beers, suggests that in some circumstances a cartel might be flexible in its response to cheating even when that cheating is massive. In this paper, we study a particular episode of such cheating by one of the diamond cartel's principal members, namely, Russia. Our findings suggest that De Beers did not respond with aggressive price competition, but rather used a policy that combined accommodation and negotiation. Key to this result were the importance to De Beers of preventing diamond prices from falling and the finn's willingness and ability to absorb excess diamonds into inventory.
De Beers, as head of the diamond cartel, influences the entire diamond trade from mining to retail. The bulk of its direct involvement, however, aside from mining, is in the purchase and sale of just-mined diamonds, or '"rough." The Central Selling Organization (CSO)l buys the rough from mines owned or controlled by De Beers, from cartel members, and also from independent producers. As a result, much of world production flows through the CSO to be sorted, valued, and ultimately resold.
2 On the other hand, the CSO' s sales downstream are carefully monitored to keep prices from falling. Consequently, the CSO holds a fluctuating stockpile of diamonds, which rises when growth in production exceeds growth in final diamond demand. De Beers supports this "supply management" strategy with legendary advertising campaigns that create and nurture final demand for diamonds while also reinforcing the image of diamonds as rare and valuable gems. It is important to keep prices from falling so as to perpetuate consumers' belief that diamonds remain as scarce as they were before the South African discoveries in the 19th century began a large expansion in their supply,3 Promoting demand allows De Beers to maintain diamond prices, despite growth in diamond production, while keeping the size of the CSO inventory under control. Together, the supply management strategy and the cartel-funded advertising that encourages final demand have convinced cartel members of the value of cooperation: diamond prices are maintained and members have a sure flow of funds from sales of rough to the CSO (Johnson, Marriott, and von Saldern 1989) .
The result of De Beers' strategy has been a long-lived cartel that continues to sell diamonds at prices far above the marginal cost of mining them (Ariovich 1985) , despite sometimes rapid growth in world production. Nevertheless, cartel members have occasionally cheated, and De Beers has a reputation for aggressive action against anyone threatening the long-run stability of the diamond market. For instance, in the early 1980s, De Beers is alleged to have punished Zaire for attempting to leave the cartel by flooding the market with the low-quality industrial diamonds that were Zaire's principal product (Spar 1994) . Similarly, De Beers greatly increased its sales of low-quality rough diamonds to Indian diamond cutters in 1996 when Argyle, an Australian company, left the cartel (Hart 2001),4 In both cases, De Beers was willing to drive down prices and take the short-tenn losses to punish defectors. However, because the grade of diamonds involved was low, price reductions at this level did not threaten the popular image of diamonds as a luxury item. In contrast, De Beers has always treated the controllers of the Siberian mines, first the government of the Soviet Union and more recently of Russia, with more caution. The Siberian finds of 1954 developed into some of the richest sources of diamonds in the world, producing roughly 20% of the world's gemstone-quality diamonds during the period of our analysis. As such, the output of these mines could have seriously disrupted the diamond markets, and, despite periodic difficulties, De Beers worked hard to negotiate contracts that would keep Soviet and Russian governments as members of the diamond carte1.
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Yet De Beers faced a serious challenge in the mid 1990s when Russia began leaking diamonds onto the market. The financial crisis in the Russian Federation apparently encouraged clandestine sales from the Russian diamond stockpile, which was of unknown, but reportedly large, size. These sales, most notably those from 1993 to 1996 (when, according to press reports, close to $1 billioQ in rough diamonds was leaked from Russia) threatened the pricing structure carefully developed by De Beers over the previous 100 years. 6 De Beers' public stance, according to a statement by Gary Ralfe, the Managing Director of De Beers, was that the cartel tried to avoid purchasing leaked diamonds so as not to bankroll those doing the leaking (Gooding 1997) . However, the CSO is popularly supposed to have increased its purchases of rough diamonds to absorb some of the extra diamonds and, thus, maintain diamond prices. Our goal in this paper is to identify and then separate long-run changes in CSO inventory and in the quantity of CSO diamond sales from short-run movements in these two variables that occurred in response to the Russian dumping. We find that the cointegration techniques that were developed to identify long-run common movements among major macroeconomic time series variables are well suited to our task.
If a set of time series variables can be shown to be cointegrated (i.e., they tend to move together over the long term), then current changes in the variables can be separated into those changes that bring variables back toward the long-run relationship, and short-run changes in response to other influences. We present evidence suggesting that a long-run relationship between diamond production, CSO inventory, and final diamond demand does exist, as would be suggested by the supply management strategy. We then use an error correction model to search for any evidence that the Russian leaks can be related to short-run changes in CSO decisions about inventory, the quantity of carats sold, or the diamond price and find that only inventory appears to have been affected by the leaks.
Although applying cointegration techniques to a microeconomic problem is uncommon, we believe it has some advantages in this case. We are principally interested in separating long-run from short-run movements in a single time series, namely, the CSO inventory. This approach allows us to do so without having to specify a model of De Beers' buying and selling decisions that incorporates their calculations about how different possible responses to cheating might affect their future relationship with Russia or with other cartel members or might threaten the popular image of diamonds in the eyes of consumers.
In the next section, we briefly review the steps involved in establishing cointegration among variables, of estimating the long-run, cointegrated relationship(s), and finally of estimating the associated short-run relationships, known as the error correction model. We then return to the diamond industry, describing the variables we expect to be cointegrated, and why. A section describing the data follows, and we then present our empirical analysis. We end with a short discussion of the results and some information about recent developments in this industry.
Methodology7
The first step in a cointegration study is to identify variables that are potentially cointegrated, that is, that move together over time. To be part of a cointegrated relationship, a variable must have the property of being nonstationary, in particular, the variable must be stochastically trended. Consider, for example, the variable Xt, where and Ct is white noise with zero mean. If Iell < 1, then X t is mean-reverting and thus has no stochastic trend over time: the variable is said to be stationary, or 1(0 Because the weighted average series is stationary, the relationship among the variables in a cointegrated vector remains stable over the long run, although at any particular time period variables might deviate from it. In economic terms, the idea is that a set of cointegrated variables can depart from a common trend in the short and intermediate run but, in the long run, will return to an equilibrium path.
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Statistical techniques only allow us to identify whether (and how many) such relationships exist within the data. We then use our knowledge of the industry and of economic theory to suggest restrictions that allow identification of the individual vectors. After testing for the acceptability of these restrictions, we can then find numerical estimates of the vectors, which show how different sets of variables move together in a long-run relationship.
Once any long-term relationships have been identified, we estimate an error correction model that consists of a particular specification of the changes in each of the cointegrated variables. 10 Suppose again that X t and Yt are cointegrated, and let us concentrate on Xt. Changes in X t are specified as where Zt is not cointegrated with X r and Yr but could be related to changes in X t and where EC t == Yr bx r • That is, current changes in the variable X t could be affected by lagged changes in itself (here just one lag) or lagged changes in Yr (i.e., in the variable with which it is cointegrated). It is also possible to add 1(0) variables, here Zt, to the right-hand side to test whether they are related to short-run changes in Xr' Finally, EC r -1 (the error correction term) controls for current changes in Xl that represent adjustment back toward its long-run relationship with other variables and is calculated with the use of the cointegrated vector linking X to those other variables. In sum, the error correction model estimates how current changes in Xl are the result of (i) recent changes in itself and in other variables with which it is cointegrated, (ii) changes in variables with which x is not cointegrated, and (iii) adjustments in response to deviations from long-run equilibrium.
The Diamond Cartel
We begin by thinking of the CSO as a dominant firm with a fringe of independent suppliers. In such a model, the dominant firm chooses its price and output to maximize profit, taking into account the supply response of the fringe. Dynamic versions of the model involve the dominant finn making price and output choices that trade off short-term profits against the incentives given to fringe firms to expand. The CSO' s pricing decisions are restricted, however, by its strong interest in preventing reductions in diamond prices. Furthermore, even aside from the fringe, the firm does not perfectly control the supply of rough diamonds but instead represents a cartel of diamond-mining firms and nations. In this section, we describe how De Beers has responded to these challenges, and why, as a result, we expect to find cointegrating relationships among the CSO inventory, world diamond production, the quantity of diamonds the CSO sells, diamond prices, and growth in final diamond demand.
De Beers' control of the diamond market was originally based on its near monopoly of diamond mines in South Africa, but today the finn's wholly or jointly owned mines represent only about 400/0 of the total world supply. As its production share slipped, De Beers drew new suppliers into the cartel with contractual arrangements that allowed it continued sway over much of the world's supply of rough diamonds, about 60-65% during the period of our study (Picton 1996; Harvard Business School 1998). The contracts call for the producers to sell their rough diamonds to the CSO. Although actual contracts with partners are secret, it appears they guarantee a certain amount of sales at minimum prices and thus provide members with the valuable assurance of a steady stream of revenue (Johnson, Marriott, and von Saldem 1989) . The contracts apparently do give the CSO some leeway to reduce purchases in particularly weak markets, relieving some of the pressure on the stockpile, but given that many cartel members count on the payments, it is generally presumed that the firm usually fully exercises its purchase rights (Lenzen 1970; Harvard Business School 1998). Diamonds that De Beers does not buy are inventoried by producers or, depending on their arrangement with De Beers, sold independently in the market.
In addition to its usual purchases from cartel members, the CSO also regularly purchases additional rough diamonds in the open market. The diamonds that appear in this market consist of the production of independent mines (e.g., mines in Brazil, Venezuela, Ghana, and Sierra Leone), cartel members' production that is sold outside the cartel by agreement, leaks by cartel members, and stolen diamonds. 11 CSO purchases are not public infonnation, but industry experts suggest that the finn buys enough to increase its share of rough from 600/0 to 65% up to 750/0 of all rough diamonds mined. Some of those same experts emphasize that the CSO might buy more, enough so that it controls 80-85 % of the rough market (see Johnson, Marriott, and von Saldem 1989) . In sum, although De Beers is not the single dominant source of mined diamonds, it has maintained control over much of the world's supply because the CSO contracts and open market purchases ensure that much of the rough ends up flowing into the CSO inventory.
De Beers' other challenge has been to prevent retail diamond prices from falling as the supply of diamonds expanded. The firm's answer has been to finance enormously successful advertising campaigns, at roughly the level of $200 million per year (Hart 2001), despite the cartel not being involved in the retail diamond business (and despite the free ride for noncartel diamond sellers on this advertising).12 De Beers' advertising has successfully fostered and maintained a link between marriages and the demand for diamonds with the diamond engagement ring, and more recently, De Beers has been successful in introducing new products, such as the eternity ring in the 1970s, the tennis bracelet in the 1980s, the diamond pendant in the 1990s, and currently the right-hand ring. 13
The CSO inventory forms a cushion between the inflow of rough diamonds and the outflow to about 200 diamond cutting and polishing firms, expanding and contracting to ensure stable diamond prices. Firms in other industries have allowed their inventories to rise, curtailing sales so as to maintain cartel prices in response to severe downturns, although those smoothing activities have tended to be relatively short lived and have not generally involved purchases of excess supplies by those firms (Scherer and Ross 1990) . In the case of diamonds, we hypothesize that De Beers has maximized long-run profits, despite its incomplete control of supply, by allowing potentially large fluctuations in CSO inventories for longer periods. 14 Although we do not model them explicitly, the firm's long-run inventory management decisions would depend on its expectations regarding its own and others' exploration and production activities, its ability to acquire or negotiate partial control of new supplies, the cost of open market purchases and of financing the inventory, and its expectations about the effectiveness of its own advertising to encourage demand. Thus, we expect to find a long-run equilibrium relationship linking the CSO inventory, world diamond production, and the final demand for diamonds that reflects this long-run profit maximization by De Beers. 15 We also include the quantity of diamonds sold by the CSO and the diamond price set by the CSO among the variables we examine for cointegration. Certainly they should be related to each other, although the demand for diamonds is fairly inelastic (von Saldern 1992) . However, world production should also be affected over time by the price and the quantity sold by the growth in demand. (Given the goal of price stability, we expect that in the long run, the quantity sold might be more strongly associated with demand growth than with price.) Furthermore, if these variables are cointegrated, we can then use an error correction model to check whether the Russian leaks appeared to affect them in the short run.
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The Russian Diamond Leaks
We use the error correction model to examine whether the Russian diamond leaks in the 1990s have short-run effects on the CSO inventory in particular, but also possibly on the quantity of 12 Although not the focus of our interest, another, more immediate tool for maintaining prices has been the CSO's practice of no-negotiation sales to a select few diamond buyers (the famous "sights") by which they carefully manage the outflow of different grades of diamonds (see Kenney and Klein [1983] and Hart [2001] for descriptions). However, Kenney and Klein (1983) also argue that, aside from controlling prices, the CSO's sorting, valuing, and sales practices significantly reduce transaction costs and that these savings are an important element explaining the longevity of the CSO and its practices. 13 We do not think of consumers as forward-looking agents whose full information about changes in diamond supplies and the CSO inventory causes them to adjust their valuation of diamonds. Rather, they are rational in their acceptance of diamond values given the information they have.
14 Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 272) point out that storable goods are more likely to be kept in inventories until demand conditions warrant sale if fixed costs are high and the good's price is much greater than its marginal cost, conditions that obtain in the diamond industry.
15 In theory, the interest rate should also playa role in determining the level of the inventory. OUf empirical evidence, however, indicates that the real rate of interest has finite memory and thus would not belong in a cointegrated relationship. Neither does it appear that the interest rate belongs as an 1(0) variable in the error correction representation. Thus, in the interest of parsimony, we decided to exclude the interest rate from our empirical analysis.
16 However, we do not expect to find that CSO prices fell much, if at all, in response to the leaks. Bergenstock (2005) estimated a model with the cartel as a dominant firm and found no relationship between prices and Russian leaks.
diamonds sold, or the diamond price, depending on the cartel's reaction to those leaks. We expect to find that De Beers did not respond to these leaks aggressively, but instead continued its supply management strategy, increasing its intake of diamonds to mop up '"excess supply." As stated above, the finn itself claimed that it avoided purchasing leaked diamonds, which would have put downward pressure on diamond prices. However, in either case, the CSO might have altered the quantity of diamonds it was itself releasing onto the market, either downward to counteract the effects of leaked diamonds it had not purchased on the price, or alternatively upward, to punish the cheaters. Because data on the leaks are unavailable, we assume that they were determined mostly by the condition of the Russian economy, and we use the Russian Government's budget deficit to proxy this condition. 17 The worse the economy or greater the budget deficit and need for hard currency, the more diamonds we expect to have been released. Use of the Russian budget deficit also allows for the possibility that leaks occurred at other times of fiscal pressure. 18
Variables and Data Sources
We estimate our model with annual data from 1973 through 2001, the earliest and the latest years we could get information on all our variables. We expect to find a long-run relationship between the CSO inventory, diamond production, and diamond demand. The variable It is the value of the CSO inventory in year t: we obtained inventory data, in current U.S. dollars, from various issues of the De Beers Annual Report and Annual Review, from Jones (1985) and from Harvard Business School (2000). The variable PROD t is world production of diamonds. We obtained estimates of the annual world production of gemstones (which include near-and cheap-gem qualities), measured in carats, from various issues of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summaries.
We use two variables to capture shifts in diamond demand: marriages and per capita income, both for the United States. Diamond sales in the United States represent from 30% to 40% of the world market in the period of our analysis (Ariovich 1985; Hart 2001 ), so we use two variablesMARt, the number of U.S. marriages in year t, and DI r , the per capita disposable income in the United States in year t-as proxies for diamond demand. We are also interested in the possible long-run relationships between these variables and Qr, the quantity of diamonds the CSO sells, and P t , the price that it sets. Data on CSO sales of rough diamonds, in U.S. dollars, are from Harvard Business School (1998), Doshi (1998) , various issues of the De Beers Annual Report and Annual Review, and the website of the South African finn E-Data (Pty.) Ltd., an Internet-based provider of financial information.
2o Data on rough diamond prices are not publicly 17 A variety of news stories draw links between the Russian budget deficit and sales of Russian diamonds, as well as precious metals (see, e.g., Farrelly 1996) .
18 See Spar (1994) for a description of the relationship between De Beers and the Soviet Union and for some evidence that at least one other episode of leaked diamonds in 1984 might have been prompted by Soviet fiscal necessity.
19 We tried including Japanese marriages and Japanese per capita income as well because Japan is also a major diamond market. However, the variables did not add much additional information about the overall demand for diamonds, so in the interests of parsimony, we dropped them from the analysis.
20 We find we can no longer access this website (http://www.edata.co.za.debeersl). However, these data are available on a piecemeal basis in the diamond industry press, as well as from the authors.
available. However, von Saldern (1990) was able to observe them for one year and extrapolate to other years according to announced price increases. We constructed an index corresponding to the average per-carat price for gem and near-gem diamonds with the use of von Saldem's data for 1973 through 1989 and the announced percent changes in prices found in Bates (1996) , Sielaff (1998), Costanza (1998 Costanza ( , 1999 (Cowitt 1985 (Cowitt , 1991 Cowitt, Edwards, and Boyce 1996) to convert to hundreds of billions of U.S. dollar equivalents.
The Consumer Price Index (1982-84 == 100) was used to deflate data on rough diamond prices, disposable income in the United States, the Russian budget deficit, and the dollar-denominated inventory held by the CSO. Table AI, column 1 in the Appendix lists the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the final estimations.
Empirical Analysis
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We first tested our variables to see whether they were nonstationary and thus possibly cointegrated. Both graphical analysis and the augmented Dickey-Fuller test suggested that inventory, production, disposable income, marriages, prices, and quantity sold are nonstationary. We tested the Russian budget deficit series and found the evidence for nonstationarity mixed. (Here, we assume that RBD is a stationary variable, but our qualitative conclusions are largely unaltered if we consider RBD as an 1(1) variable that belongs in a cointegrating relationship with inventory.) We tested to see whether, as we assumed, marriages and disposable income are exogenous data series and failed to reject that hypothesis. All the other variables are plausibly linked, and we therefore treat them as endogenous.
Having identified inventory, production, disposable income, marriages, prices, and quantity sold as nonstationary, we then tested to see whether any were cointegrated. Unfortunately, collinearity among our variables forced us to drop marriages from the model, although our overall conclusions were unaltered. Evaluation of the data series suggested the existence of three cointegrated vectors.
Having established the existence of these vectors, it is necessary to impose restrictions on some of the variable coefficients to identify them. Each vector is identified by setting the coefficient of one of the variables to 1 (nonnalizing) and setting the coefficients of two other variables to O. These 21 Our price is an average of gem and near-gem prices because diamond mining yields far more near-gems than gem-quality stones; thus, both must be sold by the CSO. Because price increases are announced separately for gems and near-gems, we calculate a price by taking a weighted average of the prices for near-gems and gems, using weights based on those developed by von Saldern (1990) . 22 The final series was based on 12 different data sources (see Bergenstock [2005] 
(Standard errors are in parentheses, with R 2 computed as the squared correlation between the observed and fitted values of In It.) Given De Beers' supply management strategy, it is no surprise to find that the vector suggests a long-run direct relationship between inventory levels and world production, and a long-run inverse relationship between inventory levels and our demand shift variable, disposable income. Over our sample period, a 1% increase in world production leads to a 1.26% increase in inventory and a 1% increase in disposable income leads to a reduction of 3.130/0 in inventory?4
We are also interested in controlling for any long-run behavior in quantity and prices, so that we can check for short-run fluctuations with the error correction model. Given that the CSO tends to keep diamond prices stable over time, we expect that shifts in demand might be more directly related to quantity sold rather than price. We therefore identify the second· vector by normalizing the coefficient of quantity to 1, and setting the coefficients on price and world output to O. 
We find that quantity sold is negatively and significantly related to inventory and positively and significantly related to disposable income: a 1% increase in the dollar inventory level implies a 0.17% decrease in quantity supplied, whereas a 1% increase in disposable income is associated with a 1.75% increase in quantity supplied. The first result implies that long-run inventory levels and sales are inversely related; the second seems reasonable given that diamonds might well be termed a luxury item with a demand particularly sensitive to income fluctuations.
For the third vector, we normalize price to 1 and set the coefficients of inventory and world production to O. The coefficient on disposable income was statistically insignificant and thus was dropped from the relationship. We find that
In P t == -0. 
Over the long term, a 1% increase in quantity leads to a 0.160/0 decrease in price. But the size and statistical insignificance of the coefficient of In Qr and the exceptionally low R 2 indicate that prices are insensitive to changes in quantity. 25 Again, this seems to match a model of long-run CSO behavior in which the finn responds to changes in demand variables by changing quantity sold more than price.
Having identified these long-run equilibrium relationships among these variables, we are able to estimate an error correction model that allows us to examine the effect of Russian leaks, as proxied by the Russian budget deficit, on changes in the CSO's inventory, prices, and the quantity sold. The full error correction model includes an equation for each endogenous cointegrated variable, with an error correction term included for each long-run relationship found in the data. Thus, we estimate four equations, each showing how current changes in a variable can be associated with current changes in other variables, whether cointegrated or not, as well as with adjustments back into long-run equilibrium relationships. The details are again found in the Appendix, and we include here only those terms that were statistically significant at the 10% level. 26 The estimated system is shown in Equations 4-7.
where~In Two findings are of principal interest concerning the short-run changes in these variables. The first is that the Russian budget deficit is positively related to short-run changes in the inventory: a $1 billion increase in RBD is associated with about a 1% increase in the CSO inventory, holding other influences constant. (Recall that~ln Y t approximates the growth rate of Yr.) We also ran simulations with RBD set to $20 billion, the largest deficit observed during the fiscal crisis of the 1990s, and all other variables set to their means. The simulations show that the value of In(l) increases from 2.68 to 3.01 within a few years, implying a 39% increase in the CSO inventory, quick increases that we see in the inventory data. To the extent, then, that RBD is a good proxy for Russian diamond leaks, it appears that the CSO did respond by increasing purchases of diamonds and allowing its inventory to rise. The second finding of interest is that the RBD variable is not significantly related to any of the other cointegrated variables: in particular, changes in neither quantity sold nor price appear associated with the RBD. This suggests that much of the cartel response to the leaks is represented by the changes in inventory; there is no evidence of any aggressive price or output response.
Other results for the short-run dynamics are mostly intuitive. First, short-run growth in disposable income has no apparent affect on price, sales, inventory, or production, suggesting that De Beers mostly ignores nonsustainable growth or declines in income in its price and output decisions. Second, an increase in price is associated with increases in future sales. Third, an increase in world production is associated with decreases in future sales but increases in inventory: a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of world production results in a 0.33% reduction in the growth of CSO sales and a 0.33% increase in the rate of inventory accumulation. This appears to be evidence of the same sort of smoothing behavior seen in the long-run relationships but carried out in response to short-run deviations. If world production of diamonds temporarily increases, De Beers appears to decrease its own sales (presumably to maintain gem prices) and to absorb some of that production into its inventories. Finally, an increase in price leads to future increases in world production. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the error correction terms are likewise mostly intuitive. If price is above its long-run sustainable path, then growth in sales will subsequently decline and inventories will increase.
27 Furthermore, downward pressure is exerted on future sales growth when current sales are above their long-run equilibrium path: the large magnitude of the coefficient on
ECQt-l in Equation 5 implies that deviations from the long-run equilibrium growth in sales are apt to be short lived. Both of these results seem compatible with cartel management of inventories, prices, and quantities aimed at maintaining price levels. Observe too that downward pressure is exerted on world production when CSO sales are above their long-run equilibrium path.
We also see that if inventory levels are above their long-run equilibrium path, then growth in prices moderates. The results show that unexpected inventory buildups are also associated with slower growth in sales, but with faster growth in world production, suggesting that world producers actually took advantage of De Beers' willingness to buy during periods of inventory excess. These effects are relatively small and hence somewhat economically insignificant, but they do lend additional support to our view of De Beers as a firm willing to incur large inventory accumulations to support prices. That is, inventory appears to serve as a buffer both in the long run, as the cointegration results show, and in the short run: only an organization like De Beers with immense financial capital could afford to adopt such a strategy over long periods of time.
Discussion
The principal goal of this paper was to investigate how the diamond cartel responded to massive Russian cheating in the mid 1990s. To do so, we first estimated a long-run relationship between inventory, world production, and final demand growth that allowed us to control for this aspect of cartel behavior when searching for short-run responses to the leaks through estimation of an error correction model. The error correction model that we then estimate substantiates the existence of the long-run equilibrium we hypothesized, and which we believe reflects long-run profit maximization by De Beers.
More to the point, the error correction model gives us our key finding, namely that the Russian budget deficit was associated with contemporary changes in the CSO inventory, but not with such changes in diamond prices or quantity sold. Together our results suggest that De Beers followed a long-run smoothing strategy and that the firm did not waiver from this strategy during the 1990s despite considerable anecdotal evidence that the Russian coffers were substantially depleted during this period and despite De Beers' reputation for aggressive responses to cheating.
Our findings conflict with the stated desire of De Beers to avoid buying rogue Russian diamonds for its inventory. News reports suggest that some of the rogue Russian diamonds were labeled as Zairian to legitimize their sale (Kaplan and Caryl 1998) . Although this might have been a way for the CSO to save face, it is difficult to believe that they were deceived, given the volume of Russian leaks, given that Russian diamonds were generally of much higher quality than those from Zaire, and especially given that De Beers was arguing with Russia about leaks at the time.
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In sum, the Russian Federation seems to have succeeded in capturing some of the cartel profits through the willingness of the CSO to buy their leaked diamonds on the open market. De Beers apparently gambled that they could weather the storm and maintain order in the diamond markets, particularly protecting diamond prices. Although the diamond cartel seemed to survive Russian cheating, the cost was high: the CSO inventory rose to its highest levels ever and was put under additional stress when the Asian financial crisis of 1997 reduced final demand for diamonds. 29 Furthermore, other developments in the 1990s, including international outrage over blood diamonds fueling African civil wars and rich diamond discoveries in Canada, presented new challenges to the cartel's control of both demand and supply of the world's diamonds. Subsequent decisions by De Beers suggest that the firm no longer believed that its traditional role managing the diamond market was viable.
De Beers underwent a significant review of its long-term strategy and announced in July 2000 that it would abandon its supply management policy (Harvard Business School 2000; Weber 2001). Instead, De Beers has opted for a new strategy based on differentiating its diamonds with a microscopic brand (Bergenstock and Maskulka 2001 ) so as to become the "supplier of choice" (Guerrera et al. 2000) . If successful, this differentiation strategy would strengthen the cartel and De Beers' place within it by cashing in on the strong name recognition of the De Beers brand, ending the free ride that De Beers advertising had always given to diamonds not sold through the CSO, and allowing the CSO to charge a premium for the cartel's diamonds. The value of belonging to the cartel will increase, and the return to leaking diamonds will decrease, giving cartel members new incentive to remain cooperative. The CSO will no longer have to finance huge inventories to stabilize the prices of all diamonds.
In another break with its traditional strategy, De Beers has begun moving into retail sales of diamonds, announcing in 2000 a joint venture with LVMH Moet Hennessy-Louis Vuitton, a luxury goods marketer. Perhaps as a result, the firm pleaded guilty in July 2004 to a charge of fixing prices for industrial diamonds in the United States, a charge first made in 1994. The settlement, which involves a maximum fine of $10 million, has freed De Beers executives to travel and live in the United States, the most important retail diamond market.
It remains to be seen whether customers can be persuaded to pay more for a diamond with a De Beers' brand, but initial test market results appeared favorable, and De Beers might maintain enough leverage to ensure the cartel's survival. Yet, De Beers might not have to rely only on the success of the new strategy. Record sales in 1999 allowed the CSO to reduce its inventory by over 20% in a single year. In addition, shareholders recently approved an offer to take De Beers private (Jewelers' Circular Keystone 2001), which should reduce pressure for short-term gains and allow the firm, should it choose, to return to some version of the long-run supply management strategy to which it has clung so tenaciously for over a century. We simply must wait on events to see how completely the new strategy displaces the old in this period of change. a trend term) to formally test whether RBD is stationary. At the 5% significance level, we do not reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity, but this could be because of the low power of the Dickey-Fuller test. With a critical value of somewhere between -2.60 and -2.63 and a calculated value of -2.6181, the null hypothesis is on the cusp of being rejected at the 10% significance level. Too, the least squares regression of RBD on its lagged value (along with two lagged differences) suggests that RBD is stationary. The coefficient on the lagged value of RBD was a mere 0.64. For the other variables, we employed the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with a trend term. The maximum lag length was set equal to 2 and the results are found in Table AI.  From Table AI , the null hypothesis of nonstationarity is not rejected at the 50/0 significance level. The Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) indicates that ADF(l) is a more appropriate test than ADF(2). We thus conclude from Figure Al and Table Al that all of our time series, with the possible exception of RBD, are first difference stationary. Here, we will model RBD as a stationary endogenous variable, but we note that our qualitative conclusions about the Russian budget deficit remain the same regardless of our decision concerning RBD.
Marriages and disposable income are treated as exogenous I( I) variables, whereas the Russian budget deficit is classified as 1(0). To test the exogeneity assumption, we determined whether a cointegrating relationship exists among In OJ and In MAR. We also included RBD as an 1(0) variable in the possible relationship and allowed a maximum of two lags in the vector autoregression. If the I( I) variables are exogenous, then no cointegrating relationship should exist among them. For a vector with no trend or intercept, the likelihood ratio value based on the maximal eigenvalue statistic (trace statistic) was 3.77 (4.91) for the alternative of one cointegrating vector against the null of zero cointegrating vectors. The 950/0 critical value was 14.88 (17.86), and we conclude that there exists no cointegrating vector between the I( I) exogenous variables.
We then jointly identified the cointegrating vectors from a vector autoregression of order 2, treating In P, In Q, In I, and In PROD as fully endogenous and In DI and In MAR as exogenous. The likelihood ratio value based on the maximal eigenvalue (trace) statistic is 22.5032 (28.8509) for r = 3. The 95% critical value is 21.920 (30.46), and the 900/0 critical value is 19.67 (27.58). We conclude that there exist three cointegrating vectors. The SBC model selection criterion validates this conclusion. Unfortunately, collinear variables forced us to drop In MAR from the cointegrating relationships. After dropping the variable we again found evidence of r = 3 cointegrating vectors by using the 90% critical value for the test statistics or by using the SBC model selection criterion. With the use of a general-to-specific modeling strategy and after imposing one overidentifying restriction, the final maximum likelihood estimates for a vector autoregression of order 2, VAR(2), are reported in Table A2 .
From Table A2 , we see that the three overidentifying restrictions appear valid on the basis of the chi-square statistic. The R 2 value is computed as the squared correlation between the observed and fitted values. Note that R 2 for the price equation is very low, implying a weak relationship between price and quantity. For clarity, the corresponding equilibrium conditions implied by the three vectors are shown in Equations A I-A3. 
The corresponding error correction models are found in Table A3 , and diagnostics for the error correction models are given in Table A4 . Diagnostics for the error correction equations corresponding to 6.1n It, 6.1n Qr. and 6.ln P t have high p values and thus do not indicate any specification problems. There is possibly a functional form or heteroskedasticity problem for the final error correction equation corresponding to 6.ln PROD. This did not overly concern us because (i) with so many diagnostics, it is likely that a few of these will have low p values even when the model is acceptable, (ii) the variable involved, 6.ln PROD n was not among those coefficients that were normalized in the cointegrating relationships from Table A2 , and (iii) our conclusions concerning the Russian budget deficit appear to be robust across a number of specifications and not just those reported here. 
